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BOOK REVIEW
DEFENDING THE ENVIRtONMENT
A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
By JOSEPH L. SAX
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971. Pp. xix, 252.
$6.95

T

HIS is a most important book. Also, it is very good reading.
Professor Sax advances far toward that elusive goal-giving coherence to the concept of "environmental law." Asserting
that the public interest in a decent environment should be
treated as a legally protected interest, he observes the recent
trend toward judicial willingness at least to listen to citizens'
environmental claims and suggests a line of substantive legal
doctrine for the courts to employ in protecting the asserted
public interest. The author's theory is woven from a number
of case studies that he also uses convincingly to demonstrate
two additional points: first, the limitations inherent in the traditional administrative agency approach to resource management
and regulation and, second, the democratizing potential of
greater judicial involvement in such issues.
Moreover, Sax's case studies, especially at the beginning of
the book, emerge in the fashion of a Gay Talese - seemingly
effortless storytelling, but, in actuality, a highly skilled marshalling of facts into a fascinating sequence. The reader is compelled to continue and, in so doing, has indelibly impressed
upon him the fact patterns that, later on, lead persuasively to
the author's creative legal theories.
Accordingly, Defending the Environment is both lawyer's
reading and layman's reading, and the more important for its
duality. To the lawyer, judge, or legislator, Professor Sax suggests a viable course of legal development, even to the extent
of supplying a model statute as an appendix to the book. To
the citizen, Sax presents a vivid, indeed, artistic, justification
for the adoption of his suggested course of action by legislators,
judges, and lawyers. In a democratic society struggling to
achieve a quality environment, Sax thus excellently exemplifies the lawyer as political scientist.
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I. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: USURPATION OR
ENHANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC POWER?

Essential to Professor Sax's plan is a substantial enlargement of the citizenry's opportunities to challenge in court both
public and private decisions involving environmental and resource management issues. Partisans in the current controversy
over citizen action and judicial activism, however, will find
something new in this book.
Both traditionalist opponents and activist proponents tend
to see expanded judicial intervention at the behest of "private
attorneys general" as a displacement of administrative agencies'
planning-managing-regulating functions and as an incursion
upon or usurpation of legislative policy-making functions. If
there be any romantic souls-- trial-oriented young lawyers or
others-who really believe such a fantasy either desirable or
possible of accomplishment, this book is not their meat. Perhaps more significantly, this volume demolishes the straw-man
that conventional critics would build out of such notions. Professor Sax repeatedly disclaims any suggestion of judicial displacement of other governmental branches. He seeks to make
the present system more effective.
As already suggested, the foundation thesis of this book
is that the public interest in a decent environment should be
treated as a legally-protected interest. Let us momentarily
forego inquiry into how that substantive legal rule may be
given life and assume that the judiciary will impose it. Would
that amount to a judicial usurpation of power? Not according
to Professor Sax's plan.
The author invokes exclusively infra-constitutional doctrine' and points out that judicial adherence to the values of
environmental quality normally would be effectuated through
equitable relief. That is, the courts would in each such case
suspend, interrupt, or substantially modify someone's promotional scheme or schemes. Any such injunctive relief would
create, vis-A-vis the legislature, what Sax calls a "legislative
remand" and a "judicial moratorium."
It would always be open to the legislature to modify or
overrule the judicial decision or decisions. The legislature would
be able to reconsider applicable public policies and, if it so
chooses, nullify in whole or in part a judicial interference with
any given resource development plan or class of such plans.
1 Sax

would oppose any attempt to develop a constitutional right to a
quality environment or to promulgate an "environmental bill of rights."
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Thus, the court's injunction would amount to a "remand" to the
legislature- the "legislative remand." By the same token, the
injunction would create, in effect, a time delay during which
the proponents of the project would be required to seek a legislative reversal if they wish to carry out their planned resource
use. That delay is the "judicial moratorium."
If the legislature approves the project or class of projects,
the moratorium would be brought to an end by the imposition
of legislative policy. If the legislature declines or omits to overrule the injunction, the judicial moratorium would, in effect,
wash into a restrictive legislative policy. Either way, the judicial remand would lead to the establishment or refinement of
legislative policy, and legislative attention would end the judicial moratorium.
Obviously, the concepts of legislative remand and judicial
moratorium assume that the proponents of enjoined or seriously
modified projects will seek legislative action. To the extent
that they omit doing so, it would appear that they deem the
defeated plan to be either not sufficiently important or unlikely
to attract legislative support. In either case, public policy would
seem to be served by the judicial intervention.
Remembering that we have momentarily assumed a standard of environmental quality to have been incorporated into
applicable law, it can be seen that judicial review of administrative agency behavior amounts only to a monitoring function:
an examination of how well the agency has applied environmental values to the case or class of cases at hand. Where the
courts reverse an administrative decision, they again invite
legislative review of the policy questions at issue -- again a
remand and, again, a moratorium, this time a moratorium on
the applicatioin of administrative policy.
Such judicial interventions, and their mere possibility,
clearly should cause administrative agencies and resource developers, both public and private, to incorporate environmental
standards more consciously into their decision-making and
policy determinations. Thus, both directly and through the ripple effect, Sax suggests, greater judicial involvement will increase the weight given environmental concerns in decisionmaking and will tend to keep administrative agencies honest.
Moreover, such judicial intervention should assist legislatures
in exercising their policy-making functions more effectively.
Sax sees that state of affairs as an enhancement rather
than a detriment to the democratic process. Inter alia, the leg-

VOL. 48

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

islature must openly and responsibly decide the important resource management questions, and the burden of going to the
legislature is shifted to the proponents of resource development
and environmental change.
While Professor Sax thus seeks to enhance the existing
processes of democracy, his presentation is in a certain way
flawed. That weakness stems from several instances throughout
the book where a liaison between the compositional need for
generality and the author's mostly successful inclination toward
the well-turned phrase produces somewhat extravagant prose.
A single example will suffice: Professor Sax gets off to a
questionable start with the first paragraph of his foreword:
We are a peculiar people. Though committed to the idea of
democracy, as private citizens we have withdrawn from the governmental process and sent in our place a surrogate to implement
the public interest. This substitute - the administrative agency is the
stands between the people and those whose daily business
2
devouring of natural environments for private gain.

To be sure, the second paragraph of the foreword immediately
begins steering toward the author's real goal. Nevertheless,
such heights of rhetoric, invoking images of a New England
town meeting panacea and, possibly, even, a "bad man" theory,
are misleading because they are quite contrary to points Sax
is at great pains to make, and makes so eloquently, elsewhere
in the book. One may expect negative critics to make good use
of such passages.
An occasional misleading gloss, however, cannot take away
from the author's real point which is otherwise persuasively
stated. Clearly, Professor Sax seeks to use the powers and
strengths of the judiciary to stimulate and improve the quality
and responsibility of the other governmental branches' actions
affecting resources and environment.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT: POWER TO THE PROMOTERS

Implicit in this volume is Professor Sax's recognition of the
elementary - but elsewhere frequently ignored - reality that
environmental concern is a function of resource planning, management, development, and use. At the beginning, therefore,
the author states what must be regarded as a truism: that the
existing legal framework for resource planning, management,
development, and use has failed miserably in protecting the
2 J.
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quality of our air and water and all other natural resources, and
that the present legal institutions have proven inadequate to the
task. But he goes a step further. Critically, and in great detail,
Sax analyzes the now-traditional "administrative law" approach
to solving such public problems. He argues, broadly, that to
design additional management, regulatory, or advisory agencies,
commissions, or procedures, or to devise coordination or supercoordination of such existing institutions or procedures will not
get to the root of the environmental problem.
Professor Sax sees that root in the basic inequality of power
between those embodying society's interest in developing our
resources and those embodying society's interest in preserving
environmental quality. Without espousing any "bad man"
theory, one may notice that a person or entity seeking to use
or develop a resource necessarily has at least a relatively
specific plan, a set of usually well-defined purposes, financial
backing, and, correlative to the foregoing, regularized lines of
communication to centers of community power, both private
and public. And that applies whether the subject be roadbuilding, timber cutting, electric power production, or real estate
development. On the other hand, those whose interests in
specific cases oppose such resource development or use ordinarily start out unorganized, seeking the more diffuse goal of
"environmental quality," absent financial backing, and without
regularized pipelines to community leadership or public officials. Moreover, in the nature of things, the developmental
interests are the initiators and the opponents are the reactors.
And that situation usually leads to myriad differentials in time
advantage, ability to develop evidence bearing on environmental risks, and capacity to develop alternate proposals.
Given such an imbalance between developmental interests
and their opponents, Sax demonstrates that, even if the administrative agency is not itself the promoter (as in the case of
timber cutting on public lands or roadbuilding), but is, rather,
a regulator (as in various uses of navigable waters or developments affecting fish and wildlife), that agency generally is
early presented with only the proponent's well prepared plans
and arguments. And let us not rely too heavily on independent
agency staff review, says the author. Too frequently, staff is
insufficiently funded to perform its statutory functions. Furthermore, the agency decision-maker, always subject to the
stresses and strains of the legislative-administrative relationship (e.g., through the agency budget process), will be prone,
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too often, to manipulate or disregard staff for reasons other
than the merits of a given case. "Sub-optimizing" is Sax's expression for the later process; seeking "other achievements" was
the euphemism of one of Sax's dramatis personae.
If the foregoing seems a trifle superficial, let the reader be
assured that those tendencies of the bureaucratic system are
amply demonstrated by several of Professor Sax's case studies,
including, most prominently, the first and lengthiest-the
"Fiasco at Hunting Creek." The Hunting Creek case is a fascinating story of an almost successful multi-million dollar real
estate development on the Potomac River at Hunting Creek,
Virginia, near Washington, D.C. The developers' plan called for
the filling in of several acres of "waste" swampland in the
river adjacent to their upland property. Thus, the promoters
were required to obtain a grant from the Commonwealth of
Virginia of its rights to the bed of that navigable stream. They
also needed a permit from the United States Corps of Engineers in order to dredge and fill. The latter agency was, in
turn, required by statute to consult with the Interior Department before acting on the permit application. Interior was
responsible for evaluating the environmental impact of such a
proposal and formulating a recommendation to the Corps reflecting that evaluation.
Professor Sax's account relies primarily upon the public
record but is well supplemented by his own interviewing. He
recounts the Virginia legislature's completely unnoticed authorization for the governor to deed away the Commonwealth's
water rights. The story includes the governor's interminable
"study" of the matter, throughout the years of which the governor's office remained totally noncommittal to environmentalists on the merits. At the federal level, the story depicts an extensive bureaucratic pas de deux, featuring the Corps and Interior, represented by various technical experts (including an
Assistant Secretary), a number of lawyers (including an Under
Secretary), and two Secretaries of the Interior, all of whom
were subject to the (variously stated) "interest" or "neutrality"
of a number of influential senators and representatives.
No brief sketch could do justice either to the facts of the
case or to Professor Sax's fascinating text. It is enough, for
present purposes, to say that the "waste" swamp turned out
to have had considerable ecological and aesthetic value and that
the developers came within a hair's breadth of obtaining, ineluctably, all legal rights and authorities necessary to carry
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out their plan - a plan which would have destroyed those
values. That near victory would have been achieved, moreover,
despite intermittent clamor in the local community by persons
who had been unable to move any federal, state, or local
agency against the project until a congressional committee took
special interest.
The strength of the Hunting Creek story in demonstrating
Professor Sax's criticism of an exclusive "administrative law"
solution to resources and environment problems is two-fold.
First, the "fiasco" proceeded without any suggestion of venality
or even of ideological favoritism. As Sax says, speaking of the
actions in the Interior Department:
[T]he villians of the piece were persons of more than ordinary
competence and integrity and .. both their personal inclinations
and the mission of their agency were in consonance with the
3
values that they betrayed.

Second, to anyone familiar with matters of resource development and use, the story is a familiar one, atypical only in that
it became a matter of public record and, thereby, had to become
undone. The Hunting Creek story illustrates, at both state and
federal levels, the everyday activities of honest government
officials, respectable businessmen, and the lawyers who represent them-lawyers, frequently, of the most impeccable professional (including ethical) credentials.
III.

THE LEGALLY PROTECTED COMMON

LAW INTEREST IN ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY

If Professor Sax finds inadequate an exclusive reliance
upon the traditional institutions of "administrative law," then
how does he propose to employ litigation to redress the imbalance of power now overly favoring society's interests in
the development and use of resources?
Sax, quite literally, perhaps more literally than Professor
Reich, suggests the creation of a variety of "new property":
the substantive right of every person, as a member of the
public, to a quality environment, a right enforceable in court.
In essence, it would be a right to be extrapolated by the courts,
both state and federal, in common law fashion, on a case-bycase basis.
Doctrinally, Sax relies upon the "public trust" concept,
3 Id. at 52.

Another Sax case study, pertaining to the Hudson River Expressway matter, also supports Sax's thesis but goes further. It suggests
the controlling influence that can be exercised by highly placed government officials in their own private interest-in that case, influence at
least of the "keep the highway out of my backyard" variety.
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having its antecedents in Roman Law but recognized, to one
degree or another, in a few American jurisdictions. 4 It is the
idea that the sovereign holds certain common real property in
trust for the benefit of the public (property such as waterways,
seashores, and common parks); that the sovereign will be held
to a trustee's standard of performance in its management and
disposition of such property interests; and, moreover, that the
sovereign will be so held at the suit of any beneficiary- any
member of the public. Sax would expand the subjects of public
trust to include inter alia, air and all publicly-owned resources.
Not only, however, would acts of the sovereign become subject to judicial scrutiny, but a member of the public, both
through the medium of the sovereign (as fiduciary) and directly
as beneficiary, would be enabled to challenge any real property
owner's use of realty in a fashion injurious to the common
property-the environment. Thus would be created an analogue to the law of nuisance wherein the beneficiaries of the
common property would stand equal to the holders of traditional real property interests. It would be a far-reaching precedent for a democratic system increasingly characterized by the
concentration of traditional real property interests of all sorts
in the hands of corporate (developmentally prone) operatives.
Professor Sax, then, is urging that courts adopt and expand
the public trust doctrine and give the beneficiaries in virtually
all cases the standing to seek protection of their interests in
the judicial forum. But how may that be accomplished?
Theoretically, the common law courts of all fifty states
might develop the necessary law and procedure, should they be
so inclined. Similarly, the courts might employ existing federal and state statutes, as some have done already, 5 to hold
specific agencies to a high degree of care in environmental
matters. Any effective reform, however, obviously will require
6
more.
Sax suggests the enactment of a model statute authorizing
members of the public to seek judicial enforcement of the "public trust" in law suits brought against any person or govern4 See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
5 Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.,
Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Parker v. United States,
307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (1971).
6 Some might argue that at the federal level the National Environmental
Policy Act cf 1969 [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Supp., May 1971), amending
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (1970)] may be sufficient if broadly construed as
in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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mental agency. By legislatively establishing the "public trust"
as the standard and by not defining that expression, the statute
would leave the courts to extrapolate the doctrine in a case-bycase fashion. Sax describes the bill thus:
Its purposes are essentially threefold: to recognize the public
right to a decent environment as an enforceable legal right; to
make it enforceable by private citizens suing as members of the
public; and to set the stage for the development of a common law
of environmental quality. As to the last consideration, the bill
purposely refrains from defining pollution, environmental quality, or the public trust. At this early stage in the development
of environmental law it is important to open the way to elucidation and consideration of a wide range of problems, many of
which are still uncertain, rather than to create confining definitions. Use of the courts to evolve a common-law approach to
environmental problems adds to the arsenal of the public interest
a significant weapon: the ability to meet problems as they are
identified and to formulate a solution appropriate to the occa7
sion- flexible, innovative, and responsive.

IV.

OF REMANDS, MORATORIA, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL EXPERIMENTS

Defending the Environment makes a strong case for Professor Sax's theory and his model law. Both theory and statute,

however, raise a number of questions, some of which are answered forcefully in the book, and some not. A few points
deserve notice.
While demonstrating well the democratizing effects of his
theories, Professor Sax does not specifically deal with the fact

that delay in the administrative process is not always benign.
Consider, for example, cases involving electric plant siting,
design, and regulation. One need not adopt any particular position regarding pumped-storage plants, nuclear plants, or the
proceedings of the Federal Power and Atomic Energy Commissions to recognize that litigation-borne delays in plant construction have played a significant part in the development of the
electric energy crisis in the New York metropolitan area. Even

conceding that basic environmental issues in electric plant cases
may center ultimately on reducing the expansion of electric
demand and on substantially revising governmental and corporate behavior patterns, the immediate social cost of crises such
as New York's could be disastrous. Accordingly, the "judicial
moratorium" and "legislative remand" deserve careful scrutiny.
Another point may be illustrated by electric industry cases
as well as those in food and drug, pesticide-herbicide, and a
at 248. The model statute has been in effect in Michigan since
mid-1970 and has been introduced in several other state legislatures and
in Congress.

7SAX
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host of other categories. Professor Sax does not come to grips
with the problem faced by judges when they cannot avoid
deciding complex, scientific, and technical issues, such as in
ecology, hydrology, chemistry, and radiation matters. The question is whether lawyers in black robes are any more capable of
proper decision-making in such instances than are the lawyers
and others who populate administrative agencies.
Also, while Professor Sax has taken great pains to show
that he does not advocate the abolition of administrative agencies, his thesis nevertheless limits the legislature's power to
delegate policy-making functions to executive and administrative agencies. The "legislative remand" requires the legislature
itself to take (or decline or omit to take) action wherever a
court has enjoined the carrying out of an administrative policy.
Patently, such judicial power limits the delegability of policymaking. But is such an undefined limitation wholly a blessing?
To the extent that the elected legislature has had "remanded"
to it the responsibility for deciding the major environmental
issues, democracy is served, and intuition suggests that, under
present circumstances at least, the quality of environment may
be served also. A legislature, however, cannot itself establish
every peppercorn of policy, and thus two questions appear.
First, since it is essential that there be some line-drawing
between the "major" questions of policy that may be subject
to "remand" and the lesser questions that the legislature may
appropriately be empowered to delegate with finality to administrators for policy extrapolation, how is that line-drawing to
be accomplished and by whom? Second, and perhaps more important, how can administrative processes be enhanced so that
delegated policy-making may be better legitimated? Can rulemaking proceedings be opened up further in both a democratic
and a due process sense? Can this be accomplished without
piling on more and greater impediments to the achievement of
finality in decision-making and policy-making? Professor Sax
might not concede these even as appropriate questions, and yet
they seem vital.
Reference again to the example of the electricity issue is
useful. It will be agreed that national electric energy policyperhaps aimed at long-term leveling of demand and production
-must be determined in a fashion consistent with both democracy and due process. It also will probably be agreed that electric energy policy is sufficiently "major" to demand open and
explicit congressional attention. But, surely, every detail of
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plant-siting, system interconnection, and environmental tradeoff cannot be decided by Congress and, viewed realistically,
will not be. How shall we determine, in the open, how to divide
the necessary legislative responsibility from the properly administrative? And what steps can we take to build greater national confidence in the administrative processes for policymaking? Irrespective of one's response to such questions, one
thing is certain: no answer may be allowed to comprehend the
possibility of total electric power failure in a metropolitan area
such as New York City pending action on a "legislative
remand."
Having advanced those several questions, one must point
out an important strength in Professor Sax's thesis, an element
that may provide the setting for the resolution of such issues.
That strength is the author's reliance on judicial experience in
decision-making to sort out the socially important from the
socially unimportant, the frivolous from the significant, as particular cases are presented. Given the crisis proportions of
America's environment and resources problems, it is probably
appropriate to rely on such judicial expertise to resolve issues
of the kind raised above. That same judicial expertise and good
sense probably should be relied on as well to avoid the proliferation of litigation feared generally by many opponents of
greater citizen participation in public decision-making.
In addition it is clearly essential that other approaches to
improving the administrative process be pressed simultaneously
- including experimentation with the ombudsman, with the
''consumers' counsel," with the traditional "reorganization" and
"coordination" of existing structures and the creation and abolition of structures, and with reforms of both rule-making and
adjudicatory procedures. Reforms designed, for example, to increase the portion of environmental decision-making based on a
written public record and written, principled decisions most
likely would complement the sort of reform Professor Sax
wants." Even the efforts to increase effective public access to
agency files could have an important effect.
If closer judicial scrutiny of the sort Professor Sax proposes
will help keep administrative agencies "honest," the Sax reforms should work in synergism with other essential reforms.
s It may be noted that Professor Sax's telling criticisms of the administrative process were directed, for the greatest part, at the more informal
procedures; but this, of course, is not to say that the more formal, quasijudicial proceedings and the agencies employing them are not also a part

of the environmental problem.
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THERAPY FOR DEMOCRACY

However one reacts to the questions raised by its thesis,
Defending the Environment compells us to give Professor Sax's
theory a fair trial.
This book is valuable, however, not only because it presents
a lucid, creative, and well-thought-out plan to help solve
environmental problems. Professor Sax offers a hope to the
individual citizen. It is a hope that could be generally therapeutic in a society presently so distrustful of its own democratic
instrumentalities, and in which large portions of the citizenry
perceive themselves impotent to affect their government's policies and, ultimately, their own lives.
One wonders about the effects of expanded citizen participation in the governmental process should it prove successful
in the sphere of environmental problems. Professor Sax's own
postscript is suggestive. Referring to a number of other social
problems in respect of which existing democratic government
appears to be failing as it has failed in protecting the environment, the book closes with the following:
Environmental problems simply illustrate our failings with
special poignancy . . . ironically, because environmental dis-

ruption affects the rich and powerful just as it does the most
humble citizen. The plunder of our natural heritage at last
brings home to us our equality-we all must breathe the same
foul vapors. The well-to-do are nct accustomed to being so dealt

with; their frustration is now a seed that will bloom in many
gardens.9
Let us hope so.
Charles A. Ehren, Jr.*

9 SAX at 245.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.

